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Introduction
We propose an information-theoretic approach for deriving
predictive collaborative strategies in a dyad. Social interac-
tion and coordination in robotics have been initially stud-
ied by Walter (1950) in natural and artificial agents and
more recently by Dautenhahn (1995); Ikegami and Iizuka
(2007); Paolo et al. (2008); Goldstone and Janssen (2005).
Our framework builds on the concept of relevant informa-
tion (Polani et al. (2001)), while not assuming any intrinsic
dynamics nor a particular metabolism, instead of imposing
certain information processing constraints. Information the-
ory provides a universal language to quantify conditions and
invariants for a large class of models in a generic and prin-
cipled way and allows to compare quantities of models that
are otherwise not directly comparable.
To study agent coordination from an information-
theoretic perspective towards a predictive and quantitative
theory of agent interactions, we consider embodied agents
with independent controllers and a redundant set of actions
for controlling an object in a grid-world, motivated by ear-
lier studies (see Wahn et al. (2016)). Using information-
theoretic tools we derive theoretical predictions for the
agents’ behavior, constrained by the level of cooperation of
its partner.
When agents interact socially, sometimes they act in
a complete agreement towards a shared goal, and other
times their goals may diverge or be completely incompat-
ible with each other. Limitations in the perception–action
loop or in the decision-making capabilities (e.g. autistic
behavior) could make the agents behave irrationally dur-
ing joint action. We investigate how a rational agent would
adapt its behavior to its irrational (or adverse) partner un-
der information-processing constraints, using the Relevant
Information method (Polani et al. (2006)), which provides a
measure quantifying the minimal amount of information an
agent needs to process in order to achieve a certain level of
utility as specified by a reward function.
Experiment
In our experimental scenario two agents with independent
controllers jointly perform a task using redundant control.
Assuming a prediction for the policy of one agent we com-
pute the optimal policy of the other using the Relevant Infor-
mation method and explore how one’s behavior influences
the other’s. The goal is to move an object from one corner
of a 2-D grid to the opposite corner along the diagonal by
applying four actions (up, down, left, right) (see Figure 1).
The state of the environment is denoted with the random
variable S and the action with A. The state transition model
p(st+1|at, st), representing the movement of the object, is
deterministic. The reward is −1 everywhere but the goal
where it is 0. Thus, a policy maximising the expected utility
is one that takes the shortest path to the goal. The shortest
path in this case is not unique, however they differ in infor-
mational cost.
We investigate how one agent’s behavior adapts to vari-
ous strategies of the other ranging from fully cooperative to
completely antagonistic (a similar treatment can be found in
Ortega and Braun (2013)). Assuming a static prediction for
the strategy of agent B, agent A optimizes its own policy
under informational constraints.
The relevant information represents the minimal level of
information required for achieving a certain level of perfor-
mance. The problem of informational parsimony can be
formulated as search for a value-optimal strategy pi∗(a|s),
which at the same time minimises the required relevant in-
formation I(S;A), i.e. is also information-optimal. This
double optimisation is transformed into an unconstrained
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Figure 1: Various strategies ranging from completely antag-
onistic to fully cooperative (from left to right). G denotes the
goal state and the arrow length represents the action proba-
bility (0.5 at the extremes and 0.25 each in the middle).
minimisation problem via Lagrange multiplier
min
pi(a|s)
(I(S;A)− βE[U(S,A)]),
which corresponds to trading in utility U(S,A) for a reduc-
tion of relevant information.
The parsimony pressure tries to minimise this quantity
while the efficiency pressure drives towards higher perfor-
mance. Therefore for β → ∞ the resulting optimal policy
maximizes the expected utility and at the same time mini-
mizes the relevant information I(S;A). This optimization
provides the policy of agent A while taking into account the
specific behavior of agent B.
Discussion
We computed the optimal policies of agent A for a range
of antagonistic and cooperative behaviors of agent B (see
Figure 1) and various levels of β.
The simulated trajectories of agent A’s optimal policies
for five collaboration rates and two β levels (a high driving
towards higher performance and a low towards information
parsimony) are shown in Figure 2, which reveal the influ-
ence increasing cooperation has on the optimal path. For
antagonistic behaviors of agent B agent A feels more con-
fident following the wall, which protects the object from
moving back as it invalidates certain actions. This period of
initial uncertainty gets shorter as cooperation increases and
agent A can increasingly rely on its partner and gradually
moves away from the wall onto the diagonal, which corre-
sponds to the optimal informationally parsimonious policy.
The results of this study suggest that when facing an antag-
onistic partner the cooperative agent exploits the particular
embodiment of its environment in order to maximize its con-
trol abilities. This demonstrates that the agent increasingly
transfers ’trust’ from the indifferent environment to a trust-
worthy agent.
The results also revealed, as anticipated, that when the
agents cooperate towards a common goal they achieve
Figure 2: Simulated trajectories of agent A’s optimal poli-
cies for five collaboration rates (increasing from left to right)
and for high (top) and low (bottom) β. Darker color de-
notes higher recurrence. For antagonistic behaviors of agent
B agent A initially follows the wall before switching onto
the diagonal. The goal is in the bottom-right cell.
higher utility at lower informational cost and vice versa,
when their goals contradict the utility level drops and the
informational cost increases. This scenario could apply
to various situations, for example when the controllers are
stochastic, the precise knowledge of the other agent’s model
is unavailable or compromised, or the other agent is adverse
or autistic.
In this particular example the proposed information-
theoretic approach highlights two types of optimal trajecto-
ries, one following the walls and another one traversing the
diagonal, and trades off these two paths on the base of the
cooperation level.
This paper presents an application of an information-
theoretic framework to a reward driven decision process in
the perception–action cycle of a dyad. It demonstrates how
the Relevant Information method could provide informa-
tionally parsimonious optimal policies for collaborative be-
haviors ranging from fully cooperative to fully antagonistic.
Furthermore, it presents an information-theoretic characteri-
sation of the trade-off between the level of collaboration and
the informational cost, elucidating the key role of the em-
bodiment.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge support by H2020-
641321 socSMCs FET Proactive project.
References
Dautenhahn, K. (1995). Getting to know each other - artificial so-
cial intelligence for autonomous robots. Robotics and Au-
tonomous Systems, (16):333–356.
Goldstone, R. and Janssen, M. (2005). Computational models of
collective behavior. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(9):424–
430.
Ikegami, T. and Iizuka, H. (2007). Turn-taking interaction as a co-
operative and co-creative process. Infant Behavior and De-
velopment, (30):278–288.
Ortega, P. and Braun, D. (2013). Thermodynamics as a theory
of decision-making with information-processing costs. Pro-
ceedings of the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical,
Physical and Engineering Sciences, 469(2153).
Paolo, E. D., Rohde, M., and Iizuka, H. (2008). Sensitivity to
social contingency or stability of interaction? modelling the
dynamics of perceptual crossing. New Ideas in Psychology,
26(2):278–294.
Polani, D., Martinetz, T., and Kim, J. T. (2001). An information-
theoretic approach for the quantification of relevance. In
ECAL ’01: Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on
Advances in Artificial Life, pages 704–713.
Polani, D., Nehaniv, C., Martinetz, T., and Kim, J. T. (2006). Rele-
vant information in optimized persistence vs. progeny strate-
gies. In Artificial Life X: Proceedings of the Tenth Interna-
tional Conference on the Simulation and Synthesis of Living
Systems, pages 337–343. MIT Press.
Wahn, B., Schmitz, L., Ko¨nig, P., and Knoblich, G. (2016). Ben-
efiting from being alike:interindividual skill differences pre-
dict collective benefit in joint object control. In Proceedings
of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Soci-
ety, pages 2747–2752.
Walter, W. (1950). An imitation of life. Scientific American,
May:42–45.
